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  THE RISE AND FALL 
 OF RIM-PAC COUNTRIES 
----- a research by a long-term econometric 
model of post-war RIM-PAC relations-----
   by 
Hiroshi Ohnishi
The Outline of the Model
  If we want to talk about post-war RIM-PAC countries, we can't neg-
lect the rise and fall of great powers: that is the long-term declin-
ing of US power and the rapid growth of Japanese economy. And recent-
ly we're being surprised at the development of East. Asian market. So, 
from the bird's eyes view, we can say that in the long run super-
powers can't remain their high economic position and the growth rates 
of developing economies are higher than advanced countries. 
 To show such a historical law -- rise and fall of the different 
stage economies, I think we must analyse the positive factors of eco-
nomic growth and the negative for each RIM-PAC country. We can assume 
the higher stages the economies reach at, the greater the negative 
factors become. 
  In my opinion, these negative factors are two, while there i's one 
positive factor. Those are following:
(A) Higher wages caused by economic growth make domestic firms to 
  move their capital to foreign countries in pursuit of lower wages. 
  This is a trend of capital movement from advanced countries to 
  developing countries, and the most important cause of rise and 
  fall of different stage economies. 
(B) Too much military expenditure and too m ch dependence o  protec=tiv  
policies that can be done by strong political power against 
  foreign countries prevent the countries' effort to invest or to 
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rationalize of productive process. For example, because US could 
put much influence on other countries" policies by his own mili-
tary superpower, still now he can't avoid the tendency to increase 
military expenditure and use "power-politics" in the diplomatic 
world in the interest of American businesses. Such military hold-
ing is in the short run very effective and beneficial for them, 
but in the long run decreases the national fund for investment and 
at last lowers its growth rate. 
Though above two are negative, higher savings caused by great 
economic power are the origin of its capital formation. Of course, 
this factor is positive. 
These three causalities may be shown by the following figure and 
detailed flow-chart is in the APPENDIX II of this paper. 
                ave ra a wa (A) 
a
ock~gro.ss produc 
In g s 
analytically, we built up a 
  RIM-PAC relationships (named 
 in APPENDIX I). And for the 
model must have the following
t
(i) We must include at least several countries that exist at the 
   different stages-of-growth. So, our model has three sectors: US, 
   Japan and 'ASEAN'. And the datum of 'ASEAN' are made by summing up 
   three countries: Philippine, Thailand and Indonesia. Malaysia was 
  excluded because of the difficulties of getting its historial 
   datum. Other East Asian countries will be included in the next 
   stage of our research. 
(ii) Our model must cover the long-term, because the 'rise and fall' 
   needs long periods. So, the estimating and simulating period has 
   been set from 1952 to 1990. And if include the forecasting period, 
  the total period is from 1952 to 2010, that is over one half
-cen-
   tury. 
(iii) The international interaction such as capital movement should 
  be incorporated in the model explicitly. (the above factor(A)) 
(iv) Especially some of such interactions are expected to be politi-
   cal, for example military pressure and protective policies. (the 
  above factor (B) ) 
(v) To show that these rise-and-falls are historically inevitable, 
   such paths made by the model may be autonomous. If -so, the number 
  of the exogenous variable of the model must be limited. In our 
   case only seven besides one unimportant dummy variable. 
             Effects of Supply and Demand Shocks 
(1) First, I estimated the long path of the effects of the temporary 
one billon dollars decrease of savings and increase of consumption in 
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1952 in Japan. This simulation is very important because the decrease 
of consumption at the same time, and by the estimation we can compare 
the effects of the former with the latter. So as to Japanese economy, 
the initial effects caused by the increase of consumption but in the 
long run supply side negative effects caused by the decrease of sav-
ings let its GDP be smaller, shown as Fig.1-1. It. is very interesting 
that the long path shows the waves, whose periodical looks like 5 
years or 10 years. 
  Fig.1-1 can clear one more important fact, that Japanese negative 
effects cause negative effects in 'ASEAN' and US. We guess these are 
because wage-cut in Japan prevents the capital movement from Japan to 
'ASEAN' and US. So, We can't underestimate the effects of capital 
movements.in RIM-PAC area, and in this sense we can say these coun-
tries have positive interdependence. Though by the demand-side export 
-import analyses some economists say internatinal economy is zero-sum 
game, by the supply-side capital-movement analyses we can say plus-
sum game. 
 On the other hand, Fig.1-2 and 1-3 show the effects if the decrease 
of savings happen i n ' ASEAN' or US. I n these figures, we can see al-
most same paths. If I add some comments on these figures, the effects 
of Japanese decrease of savings are greater than the others. I think 
this is because of high sensitivity of Japanese economic structure 
and its character of supply-initiated growth rather than demand-
initiated. 
  One more comment of mine is on Fig.1-2. This figure shows the ef-
fects on US are greater than on 'ASEAN', though the direct impact in 



















































































































1952 is on 'ASEAN'. This means that US's overdependence on other 
countries' economy. In older days many economists said US's cold 
cause Japanese pneumonia. But to some extent we must exchange the 
subject of this sentence for the object. Anyway we can explain why US 
helped other countries economy after WW II by some aids like as 
Marshall-plan. Of course, as such interdependence can be found out 
between Japan and other countries, Japanese foreign aid policies 
espeically including recent international policy cooperation can be 
explained in the same way. 
(2)The second type of simulation is to investigate the effects of 1 
billion dollars increses of GDPs mean only the increses of demand be-
cause this changes are done with no change of suply-side (capital 
stock K and population N). Fig.2-1, 2-2 and 2-3 show the effects if 
these increses happened in 1952. 
 All these figuers show the absolute value of the effects on US are 
greater than on the others, showing US's dependence on the other eco-
nomies. But about the sign of these effects, it is notable that US's 
initial positive effect of this impact turns to negative after the 
2nd period. This is because the increase of US's wage level caused by 
the initial increase of US's GDP pushs its capital out of the country 
 Not negative but small effects on Japanese economy we can recognize 
in Fig.2-1, and we may guess the causality is similar to US's ef-
fects in F i'g. 2-3. 
































































































































































































































































 (3) Because we saw the importance of capital movement caused the in-
creses of wage level, we must investigate the effects themselves by 
the change of wage level directly. Fig.3-1, 3-2 and 3-3 show the re-
sults by the simulations of 5 % impact increses of wage level of 
three economies in 1952. 
  The most notable point is that the economy that grows by its wage 
increase is only Japan although ordinary effects are negative like 
'ASEAN' or US. So we can't neglect Japanese growing power. 
  The second notable is that in all the simulations the signs of ef-
fects on Japanese and US economy are same while the signs on 'ASEAN's 
economy differ from the others'. This means Japan and US coexist in 
one community of interests. These relatinships we can see inall the 
other simulations. 
             Effects of International Politics 
  The above three types of simulations are about on the international 
effects but the effects caused by domestic policies. However we can 
investigate the effects caused by international policies . In this 
section we'll reseach the political-type international policies: they 
are military expenditures and custom duties. 
(4) In our model military expendituers and custom duties have nega-
tive effects on their economies as they decrease capital investment 
through the causality(B) already mentioned at page 1 and 2. 
 But the negative causalities could be estimated at only 'ASEAN's 





















































































































and US's investment equations while the coefficient of military ex-
penditure in Japanese investment function could not be estimated 
significantly. 
  Thus, we'll examine the effects of 1 billion dollars increase of 
military expenditure of ' ASEAN' (F i g. 4-1) and of US (F i g. 4-2) . I n 
both figures almost all effects are negative. So, we can say military 
expansions are not beneficial for the whole world. For example US's 
military expansion slowed down Japanese growth rate too as shown in 
Fig.4-2. Therefore we,can't explain Japanese rapid growth as a result 
of the slowdown of US economy caused by greater burden of military 
expenditure. Rather than saying so, we must explain it as a result 
of the smaller waste such as military expenditure in Japan itself. 
  Additionally speaking, it also is interesting that in Fig.4-2 only 
'ASEAN's economy gets positive effects whil
e the others' negative. By 
this results, we may say 'ASEAN's economy is relatively independent 
on other economies, especially on US economy. 
(5) Different from the former simulation, causalities related to the 
increase of custom duties could be estimated at only Japanese and 
'ASEAN's investment equlations while couldn't at US's . But almost all 
other characteristics are same as the simulations of'military expend-
iture. Long-term effects of one hundred million dollars increase of 
Japanese and 'ASEAN's custom duties in 1952 are equally negative as 
shown in Fig.6-1 and 6-2. 
 Though acutual effects of custom duties must include the effects of 
the decrease of imports (or favorable turn of balance of payment), 










































































































































our simulation doesn't consider the latter effects because in our 
model how customs affect on imports are unknown. So, we must pay our 
attention to this point. 
                  Effects of International Trades 
  (6) As the simulation(5) showed the necessity to investigate the 
efficency of trade policies, we've measuered the effects of 1 billion 
dollars increase of each economy's balance of payment in 1952 as 
shown in Fig.6-1, 6-2 and 6-3. 
 By the way, if balance of payment becomes better, total demand will 
become greater and investments will be stimulated by the reduction of 
custom duties that can be done under faborable trade con-ditions. So, 
we can regard these effects consist of demand-pull elements and sup-
ply-push(investment) elements. From this point of view, if we compare 
Fig.2 (simulation(2)) with Fig.6 (simulation(6)), we can find the 
similar paths in these three figures. 
 Of course, though above two side effects are initially positive, 
they are not necessarily positive in the long run. But in usual cases 
 we can guess when the signs of supply-side effects are plus (minus) 
,the signs of demand-side plus (minus). Thus, we don't need to wonder 
why the absolute values of the effects in Fig.6-2 and 2-3 are nega-
tive and why the absolute values of the effects in Fig.6-2 and 6-3 
are multiplied of them in Fig.2-2 and 2-3. 
 By the way, the effects of the favorable turn of Japanese trade 
conditions (shown in Fig.6-1) are completely same as the effects of 
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the increase of Japanese GDP (shown in Fig.2-1). This is because the 
second type causality (balance of payment--*custom duties-+investment) 
doesn't exist until 1964. Check our custom duties equlations of Japan 
(30) that are listed in the APPENDIX I of this paper. 
  Finally, by Fig.6-3, we can recognize the lack of US growth power 
again. 
(7) By combining F ig. 6-1 , 6-2 and 6-3, we can estimate the effects of 
additinal exports of one country to the others. Fig.7-1, 7-2 and 7-3 
show them of Japan to 'ASEAN', of Japan to US, and of 'ASEAN' to 
Japan respectively. By the Fig.6-3 we can say US's additional imports 
are beneficial for total RIM-PAC economies, so Fig.7-2 and 7-3 are 
showing positive effects. 
 On the other hand, Fig.7-1 shows the effects of additional exports 
of Japan to 'ASEAN' are negative. It comes from the difference of 
the effects between by the change of Japanese trade condition and by 
'ASEAN's. 
  Consequently, by our simulations we've found the policies for the 
global interests may be additional exports of Japan to US: of 'ASEAN' 
to Japan. So, we can summarize the best order as ' ASEAN' -* Japan--)- US. 
We can assume the order of activeness of these countries on the basis 
of this order. 
            Effects of International Immigrations 
 Already in above section we've studied the effects of the inter-
























































































































































































































































































national movement of products. However, not only these products but 
also populations themselves can be moved from one country to another. 
This is the purpose that in this section we'll examine. For this pur-
pose, firs. we'll estimate the effects of the increase of each coun-
try's population. Then, we'll caluculate the effects of inter-
national immigrations. 
(8) Fig.8-1, 8-2 and 8-3 show the effects of'one hundred thousand in-
crease of each economy's population. And it is notable that only the 
increase of US's population has negative effects on 'ASEANS's GDP. We 
guess this is because the initial increase of US's total exports 
caused by the increase of US's GDP lowers 'ASEAN's gravity for US's 
total exporting. Thus, 'ASEAN' can raise custom ratio with smaller 
pressure by US but such dependence on political protection weaken the 
effort of 'ASEAN's investor in some cases. So, increase . of US's popu-
lation doesn't have positive effects on all the RIM-PAC countries 
necessarily. 
  The second characteristic is about the size of effects. The total 
effects on three RIM-PAC economies in 1990 are 6.16 billion dollars 
effects of increase of Japanese population), 1.02 ('ASEAN') and 0.59 
(US). So, we can recognize Japan as the most desirable country that 
must receive the immigration. 
  On the other hand, US is probably in saturation to accept more im-
migration. This estimate is consistent with the fact US is full of 
unemployed persons. 


































































































































































































(9) Fig-9-1, 9-2 and 9-3 were made by combining Fig. 8-1, 8-2 and 8-3. 
In these simulations we assumed that population tends to shift from 
lower wage countries to higher wage countries. So, we estimated the 
effects of one hundredthousand immigrations from 'ASEAN' to Japan 
F i g. 9-1) , from 'ASEAN' to US (F ig. 9-2) and from Japan to US (F ig . 9-3) 
. Though now Japanese wage level is higher than US, we assumed the 
third immigration from Japan to US because US wages were higher than 
Japanese at the early phases of this simulation period. 
  By the analyses of Fig.9-1 and 9-3, we can say that because Japan 
has the strongest growthing power, the effects of the immigrations to 
Japan are positive while them from Japan negative. Especially it is 
notable that though US's population increases in Fig.9-3, US's GDP 
decreases. We can guess this is because the decreasing Japanese GDP 
pulls down US's GDP by way of international capital movement. Conse-
quently, the desirable directions of immigration are to Japan from 
other countries. 
   On the other hand, Fig.9-2 shows the negative effects on 'ASEAN's 
economy because 'ASEAN's population decreases. Besides, it is inter-
esting that the effects on US changed from positive to negative, and 
then from negative to positive. This is because of the change of 
which has the larger absolute value the negative effects of the de= 
crease of 'ASEAN's population or the positive of the increase of US's 
. But of course because of the negative total effects on three econo-
mies, we can't recommend the immigration from 'ASEAN' (or Japan) to 
US. As US is full of unemployed persons, it has no more capacity to 
receive immigrations. 













































































































































































































                   Forecasting the Future 
  Another interesting simulation test is for the forecast of the fu-
ture of RIM-PAC area. How weak shall US economy in 2010 ? How strong 
Japan ? How ASEAN ? Our model can investigate such future situations. 
  According to our simulation test, the situations of these three 
sectors in 2010 are measured as shown in Table 1. By this table, we 
can expect the continuation of the boom in 'ASEAN' countries. Besides 
        Table 1 2010's situations of RIM-PAC countries 
                    GDP (bn $) GDP per capita ($) 
                 Japan 'ASEAN' USA Japan 'ASEAN' USA 
  1991 3618 254 5673 29286 849 22450 
  2000 6614 639 8004 51237 1826 30072 
  2010 12079 1763 11084 91732 4457 39414 
annual growth rate 
 2000/1991 6.9 10.8 3.9W 6.4 8.9 3.3 
 2010/2000 6.2 10.7 3.3 6.0 9.3 2.7 
             Ratio of Trade Balance to GDP(%) 
                  Japan 'ASEAN' USA 
   1991 1.8 -4.5 -1.2 
   2000 1.3 -3.5 -1.4 
   2010 1.0 -3.1 -1.6 
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i      the ratio of GDP per capita between Japan and US will become 2.3 
    1.0 in 2010 while the ratio in 1991 was 1.3:1.0. This means the law 
   of 'rise and fall' can't be stopped at least until 2010. 
     One more proof of American difficulties between 1991 and 2010 is 
   shown in the 3rd section of this table. That is US's trade balance 
   (ratio to GDP) will go from bad to worse, while 'ASEAN' balance to 
    better. So as to Japanese trade balance,. its. excess- of_ exports. over 
    imports will decrease. 
                   The Rise and Fall with Forecasts 
   (10) By using the result of our forecast, we can calculate the long-   
.term series of growth rate of three economies from 1951 to 2010 as 
   shown in Fig.10-1. In the Fig.10-1, three long paths are showing the 
    rise and fall of these economies. There are some characteristics as 
   follows: 
     First: 70s (and partially 60s) was a high growth rate period for 
    all the economies. I think it was one phase of medium-term economic 
   cycle. 
     Second: The periodical of the longest cycle of 'rise and fall' of 
    superpowers are one or two hundred years. So, we must.see this figure 
   from the longer perspective. From that we can recognize the long term 
   declining of US and Japanese growth rates while rising of 'ASEAN's. 
   By using OLS method, we've estimated growth rate equations as func-
   tions of time series only. The equations are: 





















































































= 19.550 - 1.0829TIME 
(8.2556) (-3.3655) 
R2 =0.5311, DW=1. 9735,                  FO 
= 3.9997 + 0.70941T I ME 
(1.0186) (1.3297) 
R2=0.1502, DW=1.7512, F (1 
 8.7940 - 0.37725 TIME 
 (6.2227) (-1.9647) 
                  FO R2 =0. 785, DW=0. 5702,
economic growth rates of 
 : when 1951-55 TIME = 1 
  when 1961-65 TIME = 3,
  , 10)=11. 33
, 10)=1.77
  , 10) 3 86 
each economy 
    when 1956-60 
    etc
TIME =2
  So, we mustn't be stolen our eyes on only Japan-US relations, 
though many theorists are. The most important fact is that both US 
and Japan are declining and 'ASEAN' rising. Until 9.0's 'ASEAN's 
growth rate has surpassed Japanese. 
 The next notable point is that Japanese declining speed is faster 
than US's. If the speeds of two countries are constant, sooner or 
later. we'll have to experience the second opposite surpass. 
 Fig.10-2 was drawn by using the datum of final test solutions and 
forecasts.'Except for the earliest phase of Japanese growth path, not 
so different paths we can observe in this figure.
(11) We 
ratios
can describe such rise-and-falls by using 
to GDP, because these ratios represent the 






























































































































































tiveness against foreign countries. Thus, by observing Fig.11-1 that 
also covers the forecasted period, for US economy we can say the 
period from 1945 to 2010 is in a declining stage because the ratio is 
constantly increasing. 
  On the other hand, Japanese path shows increase in the early stage 
until the former half of 60's, and in the next decrease, but after 
the 2nd half of 80s increase like as US. So, we can say at least 
after the 2nd half of 80s Japan stays in the declining stage. 
  Finally, 'ASEAN's path rised until around 70s and after that de-
clining when we neglect small waves. In this sence in 70s 'ASEAN' 
turned into the rising stage from its stagnant. 
  As same as Fig.10-2, Fig.11-2 was drawn by using the datum of final 
test solutions until 1990. Though some turning points are little dif-
ferent from F,ig.10-2, we can observe almost same paths in Fig.12-2. 
As the final test solutions may be probably fundamental series with-
out additive deviations, in one sence Fig.11-2 expresses more impor-
tant paths rather than Fig.11-1. 
(12) Though both US and Japan are in the declining stage, we must not 
neglect that each severity is significantly different because the 
period when Japan entered this stage wasn't so old like US. In other 
words, while a lot of weaknesses of US economy we've found out at the 
above simulations, Japanese weaknesses that we've known are only few. 
For example, US has been weak even in its growing power itself, while 
we can guess Japanese weaknesses comes from only the recent capital 
outflow. 
                                 -26-
 We can identify this difference by Fig.12. This figure shows the 
effects on GDPs of each country when all the international capital 
movement is shut out. And the reason why Japanese path is positive 
is that by this 'shut out' Japanese capital remains inside the domes-
tic territory. But so as to US, at 1989 the path turned to negative. 
So, already US economy has fallen into the dependence on other eco-
nomies in this sence, and this is the most important difference from 
Japanese economy. To reach at this type of declining stage Japan may 
take several decades. 
         Fig.12 IF CAPITAL MOUECEIT IS SFJT OUT 
                    EFFECTS ON GPs (bn 0 
  700 
6 
  500 
I 
  400 
  S0 
  100 
. 
                                                                                                                .~.
-- . -.-. ----
----------
     1952, 
     his stu 
countries by 
      rewrite
   - i W 
 In t 
let me
1957 
   GDP 
dy,    we 
 ing a us 
  some
1962 1967 1972 1977 1 
                             `,
of JPN •---- GDP of ASEAN ... GDP of 
     Conclusions 
have examined the rise and fall 
 long-term econometric model. 
interesting conclutions. They 
            -27-
    987, 
USA 




(i)By incorporating international transactions both economic and 
  political, our model can describe the rise and fall of RIM-PAC 
   countries. 
(ii)The above simulation tests made it clear that three economies had 
  much,interdependen.ce than it had been believed. 
(iii)While US economy doesn't have much vitality, in some cases Japan 
  and other cases 'ASEAN' show their vitalities. We can guess the 
  difference comes from the difference of stages-of-growth. 
(iv)The law of rise and fall will not be stopped at least until the 
  early stage of the 21st century. 
(v)At around 2010 Japanese GDP will surpuss US's and its GDP per 
  capita will become twice as large as US's. 
(vi)After the second half of 80s Japan entered the declining stage. 
  Thus, now only 'ASEAN' is in the rising stage. The most important 
   difference of growth power is between 'ASEAN' and two advanced 
   countries. 
 Additionally speaking, we've kept the following question not to be 
answered: what is the most consistent theory with this model. I think 
in the point that our model. incorporates the factor(B), we can regard 
it as Paul Kennedy's model. But the person who laid stress on the 
factor (A) i s V. I .Lenin as well as neoc l ass.i ca l theorists. Lenin said 
in the long run international movements are the most important mat-
ters and cause uneven development among capitalist countries. In this 
sence, our model can be called as Lenin-Kennedy model. We must con-
sider the reality of the 'rise and fall' in the context of uneven de-
                                  -28-
velopment of post-war RIM-PAC economy.
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                    'THE EQUATIONS 
                          OF 
        THE JAPAN-ASEAN-USA-LINK MODEL 
                      (JAU L-Mo d e I ) 
 1_ INVESTMENT-PRODUCTION BLOCK 
(1) PRODUCTION (JAPAN) 
    InY j /N j =-1.0314+0.89150 In K j /N j 
               (-10.455) (52.836) 
    R 2 = 0.9862 D W = 0. 1024 F (1, 38) = 2791 (1952-91) 
(2) PRODUCTION (ASEAN) 
AR1 I n Y a=-10.956 + 0.926221 n K a+ 0.864541 n N a 
          (-3.6498) (12.648) (3.2683) 
    R 2 = 0.9168 D W =1.5600 F (2, 37) = 212 (1951-90) 
(3) PRODUCTION (USA) 
AR1 I n Y u/ N u=-0.60006 +0.845331n K u/ N u 
               (-3.8460) (30.295) 
    R 2 = 0. 9918 D W =1. 9055 F (1, 44) = 5279 (1946-91) 
(4) POPULATION (JAPAN) 
     Nj=Nj 
(5) POPULATION (ASEAN) 
     N a = N a 
(6) POPULATION (USA) 
     Nu=Nu 
(7) CAPITAL FORMATION (JAPAN)    
I i =256.76+1.7431 (S j + B C -26.967R i -7525.3 (C D j / Y j) _ , 
      (2.6358) (19.865) (-2.4635) (-1.2210) 
     R 2 = 0. 9688 D W = 2.0003 F (3, 36) = 404.6 (1952-91), 
(8) CAPITAL FORMATION (ASEAN)    
I a= 5.0400 + 0.84970 (S a + B C a) - 73.692 M E a/ Y a -143. 88 C D a/ Y a 
      (2.3487) (67.618) (-1.8410) (-2.1047) 
    R 2 = 0. 9924 D W =1. 7693 F (3, 36) = 1705 (1951-90) 
(9) CAPITAL FORMATION (USA) 
AN I u = 98.00 + 0. 57872 (S u + B C u) -, - 895.19 (ME u / Y u) _ , 
      (2.6197) (19.063) (-2.2049) 
    R 2 = 0. 9279 D W =1.8817 F (2, 37) = 252 (1952-91) 
                                   -30-
(10) CAPITAL STOCK (JAPAN) 
     K 1= (1 -D i) K j-,+ 11 -, 
(11) CAPITAL STOCK (AS EAN) 
      K a= (1 -D a) K a-,+ I a-, 
(12) CAP I TAL STOCK (USA) 
      K u= (1 -D u) K u_,+ I u_, 
11_ DISTRIBUTION BLOCK 
(13) DOMESTIC SAVINGS (JAPAN) 
     S 1 =4.9699+0.21132 Y -, 
        (0.7984) (38.727) 
    R 2= 0.9746 D W=1.4991 F (1, 38) =1500 
(14) DOMESTIC SAVINGS (AS EAN) 
AR1 S a = - 2. 9983 + 0. 31029 Y a -, 
         (-1.8037) (17.232) 
     R 2 = 0. 8823 D W.= 1. 8289 F (1, 38) = 286 
(15) DOMESTIC SAVINGS (USA) 
AR1 S u =37.419+0. 15942 Y u -, 
       (1. 0610) (13.943) 
     R 2 =0.7793 D W = 2.0034 F (1, 38) =137 
(16) WAGE LEVEL (JAPAN) 
    WJ=11 .6350(Vi/Ni 
        (40.927) 
     R 2 =0. 9639 D W =1. 3038 
(17) WAGE LEVEL (ASEAN) 
    W a =0. 98278 +3449.3 (Y a / N a) -, 
       (3.4597) (5.2292) 
    R 2 = 0.4398 D W = 2.1197 F (1,38) =31.2 
(18) WAGE LEVEL (USA) 
    W u = 62.852 + 166795 (Y u / N u) -, 
       (2.3705) (12.822) 








III- INTERNATIONAL TRADE & CAPITAL MOVE-
     MENT BLOCK
(19) BALANCE OF CAPITAL (JAPAN) 
    B C i =-89.987-17.962 (W j / (25 * W a + 4 * W u) ) -,+11.663R i 
          (-3.5237)(-2.5098) (3.9260) 
    R 2 = 0.6276 D W = 0. 6844 F (2,37) =33.86 (1952-91) 
(20) BALANCE OF CAPITAL (ASEAN)    
I n B C a =-6.6407-2.08621n (25 * W a / (4 * W u + W j)) -, 
           (-7.4165) (-7.8061) 
    R 2 =0. 6313 F (1,34) =60.94 (1952-91) 
(21) BALANCE OF CAPITAL (USA) 
    B C u =131.47+1212.5 (Wa/Wu) -,-19.047R j +68.805D8588 
         (3.0857) (1. 9499) (-3.2149) (3.9993) 
    R 2 = 0. 6765 D W =1.3441 F (3,36) =28.19 (1952-91) 
(22) BALANCE OF TRADE (JAPAN) 
ARI B P j / Y j = 0. 07923 - 0. 00000063748 (W j / (Y j / N j)) -, 
              (3.9606) (-4.1895) 
    R 2 =0.3013 D W =1.7184 F (1,38) =17.80 (1952-91) 
(23) EXPORT (ASEAN) 
     E X a - 2. 7654+ 0. 25360 Y a 
          (-6. 3326) (58. 3647) 
    R 2 =0.9884 D W = 0.9567 F (1,39) =3406 (1951-91) 
(24) IMPORT (ASEAN) 
AR1 I M a= -3. 6148+0. 28233 Y a 
          (-1. 1394) (12. 3347) 
    R 2 =0.7717 D W =1.6267 F (1,39) =136 (1952-91) 
(25) BALANCE OF TRADE (ASEAN) 
     BPa=EXa-IMa 
(26) EXPORT (USA) 
AN E X u = - 23.525 + 0. 075101 Y u 
          (-1.6026) (15.297) 
    R 2 =0.8330 D W=0.8119 F (1,39) =200 (1952-91) 
(27) IMPORT (USA)      
I M u = -39.012+0. 095126Y u 
          (-12.333) (75.303) 
    R 2 = 0. 9930 D W = 0. 6358 F (1, 39) = 5671 (1951-91)
-32-
 (28) EXPORT FROM USA TO ASEAN 
     E X u a=28.864Ya 
           (44.228) 
     R 2 =0.9671 D W =1.0210 (1952-91) 
 (29) BALANCE OF TRADE (USA) 
      BPu=EXu-IMu 
IV_ INTERNATIONAL POLITICS BLOCK 
 (30) CUSTOM DUTIES (JAPAN) 
    C D j/ Y j=-0.0019920+13.738 (K j/ N j) 
               (-1.3878) (4.7934) 
     R 2 =0.6283 D W = 0. 9141 F (1,12) =22.98 (1950-63) 
   C D j / Y j = 0. 0040347--0.00051752 (BP j /BPu) _, - 0. 080178 (BP j / Y j) _, 
              (13. 181) (-1.2979) (-3.9201) 
    R 2 = 0. 3374 D W = 0. 6636 F (2, 25) = 7. 87 (1964-91) 
 (31) CUSTOM DUT I E S (ASEAN) 
     C D a / Y a = 0.032131.0. 0005133 (EXua/EXu) _, - 0.078601 (B P a / Y a) _, 
               (17.650) (-6.5748) (-3.4113) 
    R 2 = 0. 5497 F (2,37) =24.80 (1951-91) 
(32) CUSTOM DUTIES (USA) 
     C D u/ Y u= 0.00157 (1952-63) 
AN C D u /Y u =0. 0019215 +0.0098848(1 M u /Y u) -, 
              (6.5460) (2.3299) 
     R 2 = 0. 2492 D W = 2. 0857 F (1, 26) = 7. 70 (1964-91) 
(33) M I L I TARY EXPENDITURE (JAPAN) 
                                                         -, M E j = 0. 19700 + 0. 0082885 Y i 
         (11.167) (31.188) 
    R 2 = 0. 9828 D W =1. 2273 F (2, 16) = 973 (1952-69) 
AN M E j / Y j = 0.0089413 + 0. 00093547 (Y j / (Y a + Y u)) _, 
              (19.162) (1.1720) 
     R 2 =0.8938 D W = 2. 1228 F (1,20) =133.4 (1970-91) 
(34) M I L I TARP EXPENDITURE (ASEAN) 
    ME a/Ya=0.92131(Ya/ (Y j +Yu)) _, 
             (25.587) 
    R 2 = 0. 3535 D W =1. 1435 (1952-91) 
(35) M I L I TARP EXPENDITURE (USA) 
AR1 M E u / Y u = 0. 045784+ 0. 0054308(Y u / (Y j + Y a)) -, 
              (10. 517) (8. 2104) 
    R 2 = 0. 8335 D W =1.4380 F (1, 38) =194 (1952-91) 
                                 -33-
* "AR1" : estimated by ML assumed 1st order serial correlation of the errors. 
 R 2 : coefficient of determination revised by D.F.. 
 D W : durbin watson ratio 
 F (•) :F value 
 In x : natural logarithm of x 
             THE LIST OF VARIABLES 
                         JAPAN ASEAN UNITED STATES 
                Population N j N a N u 
      Gross National Product Y j Y a Y U 
            Domestic Savings S j S a S U 
     Gross Capital Formation I j I a I U 
             Capital Stock K j K a K u 
           Balance of Trade B P j B P a B P u 
                   Export E X a E X u 
    Export from U.A. to ASEAN E X u a 
                    Import I M a I M U 
  Balance of Capital Movement B C j B C a B C u 
       Military Expenditure M E j M E a M E u 
             Custom Duties C D j C D a C D u 
    Average Depreciation Rate D j D a D u 
         Interest Rate (%) R j R u 
     Average Wages (Industry) W j W a' W u 
Dummy Variable (1985 ^ -88=1,others=0) D 8588 
  *unit; W ' J /month 
        W a dollar/day 
        W u dollar/week 
         R j percent 
          N j , a, u thousand 
          Dj, a, u no unit 
         Dummy Variable no unit 
        others billion dollars
-34-
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